By Janis Siegel, JTNews Correspondent
Anyone entering Kane Hall to hear Dr. William Quandt’s lecture on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict at the University of Washington in March had to undergo a mildly intrusive security check before they could get settled in their seats. Quandt’s presentation, “Can the U.S. Revive the Peace Process?” was sponsored by the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and its Center for the Study of Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution. It was one of a handful of lectures on the campus for which security checks have become mandatory.
During a week when some of the bloodiest clashes had occurred between Israelis and Palestinians and U.S. envoys had traveled there to affect some sort of diplomacy, Quandt spoke about how U.S. policies in the Middle East need to relate to its own domestic agenda as well as serve the peace process. Quandt outlined his vision for America’s objectives in any future negotiations concerning the land he referred to as Israel-Palestine.
Quandt is currently a professor and vice provost for international affairs at the University of Virginia. He was a former member of the National Security Council and was involved in the negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords and Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Prior to his appointment at the University of Virginia, Quandt was a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution.
“I may have it wrong and I may be too pessimistic,” said Quandt about the Bush White House, “but this is an administration that hasn’t yet started to think strategically about the Middle East. A war there would signal a collapse in American policy in the Middle East region despite the billions of dollars the U.S. has pumped in. The trend line has been very discouraging.”
Quandt praised the latest peace proposal offered by Saudi Arabia in which Israel would, among other things, return to its pre-1967 borders in return for recognition by Arab countries. Seeing a glimmer of hope in this offer, Quandt would appeal to the Israelis to consider this plan and make a step toward normalizing relations with its neighbors.
“The fight is not about Israel’s existence,” said Quandt, “it’s about occupation. If the Saudis don’t say that, the Israelis will have the suspicion that it’s about their existence.”
In agreement with Quandt is Joel Migdal, the Robert F. Philip Professor of International Studies in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. According to Migdal, Israel must trust but verify.
“Ultimately, in the end,” said Migdal, “if Israel is going to accept this, it will be on the basis of its belief in their underlying security. Israel has to weigh having the means of dealing with them if they don’t mean it, while taking risks by believing they do mean it. Can the Arabs do anything that will help Israel come to terms with giving back the land? The more they reassure Israelis by proffering a plan like this, they will go farther in reassuring Israel.”
Quandt would call on the Saudis to come across with actions to back up their words.
“They may not be ready for an Israeli embassy in downtown Riyadh,” said Quandt, “but let’s put them to the test.”
According to Quandt, when the 1993 Olso Accords did not result in an agreement between then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, the Palestinians saw this as a failure for their situation because it resulted in roadblocks in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Quandt described their current plight as a hopeless dead end.
“I came to the conclusion that they did almost make it,” Quandt said, reflecting on the Oslo meetings, “but they assumed that both parties had a similar destination in mind. There were totally different interpretations of where Oslo would wind up. From 1996 on, the momentum and confidence were being lost.”
Migdal, who believes that the Camp David Accords failed because then Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak was an “extraordinarily poor politician” and “Arafat handled it poorly,” agrees that the situation is in need of a sustainable resolution.
“In the long term,” said Migdal, “it is untenable for a small number of Israelis to rule a large number of Palestinians. Ultimately, I think that’s why Israel went to Oslo.”
Eventually, according to Quandt, as a broker in the ongoing peace process, the United States must look at its own role in the politics of the Middle East. He faulted the United States for supporting hypocritical policies in the region, citing America’s apparent support of “old-style, patriarchal regimes that have served the regions poorly, to which we don’t seem to pay too much attention.” He also criticized President Bush for creating ill will by designating both Iran and Iraq as part of the axis of evil. Quandt said these are the kinds of actions that provoke, or at the very least cause displeasure, among countries in the region.
According to Quandt, the U.S. has five strategic interests in the Middle East: They are reducing the threat of a war, preserving our access to oil, promoting democracy as a value, achieving peace through diplomacy and effective engagement with Iran.
“We need to see realities as they are, not as we’d like them to be,” Quandt said. “There are many people in the Middle East that do not support Osama bin Laden, but nonetheless expressed sympathy with his purposes. We need to take a hard look at prevailing assumptions that have guided policies by wishful thinking and autopilot.”